Industrial organization implications of QR trade regimes : evidence and welfare costs by Condon, Timothy & de Melo, Jaime
Policy,  Research,  and  External  Affairs 1
WORKING  PAPERS  Y(j)  Y  1
Trade  Policy
Country  Economics  Department





of QR Trade Regimes
Evidence  and  Welfare  Costs
Timothy  Condon
and
Jaime  de Melo
A three-sector calibrated simulation model is used to examine
the welfare  effects of an increase in quantitative trade restrictions
when production in some sectors is characterized by increasing
returns to scale.
The Policy, Research, and Extemal Affairs  Complex distnbutes PRE  Working Papers to disseminate the  findings  of work in progress and
to encourage the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and all others interested in development issucs. Thcse papers carry the names of
the authors, reflect only their views, and should he used and cited accordmngly  The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are the
















































































































d|Policy,  Research,  and.External  Affairs
F  Trade  Policy
WPS 487
This paper-a  product of the Trade Policy Division, Country Economics Department-  is part of a larger
effort in PRE to help developing countries design more effective trade policy. Specifically it is part of a
PRE research project or "Industrial Competition, Productive Efficiency, and Their Relation to Trade
Regimes."  An earlier version of the paper was presented at the meeting of the "Applied Econometric
Association" in Istanbul in December 1986. Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818  H Street
NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact Rebecca Sugui, room N10-031, extension 37951 (23 pages,
including tables).
Mhe  empirical evidence reviewed by Condon and  progressively tighter QRs, starting from a regime
de Melo suggests that in developing countries  with no QRs.
that protect trade with quantitative restrictions
(QRs), too many domestic manufacturing firms  These simulations suggest that the traditional
tend to operate on too small a scale, often  welfare costs for moderate rationing could be
making above-average profits.  tripled if the manufacturing sector had increasing
returns to scale.
Cross-section econometric evidence -
considering factois that influence profitability in  A 20-percent rationing of intermediate and
three sectors - supports the view that imports  consumption goods could result in a welfare loss
impose a discipline on the behavior of domestic  of about 2 percent of national income if econo-
firms.  That is, firms in sectors with heavy  mies of scale and industrial organization are not
imports tend to adopt pricing rules that resemble  considered. When industrial organization
competitive behavior.  considerations are considered, the welfare loss
could quadruple.
On the basis of this evidence, Condon and
de Melo built a three-sector simulation model to  Simulations conducted for alternatives - the
examine the welfare effects of an increase in  entry of enough firms  to eliminate prorits or
QRs in sectors that have increasing returns to  oligopolistic pricing with no new firms entering
scale.  They introduced several model variants to  the sector - suggest a trade-off between exces-
ascertain the effects of industrial organization  sive firm entries and collusive behavior.  Collu-
considerations:  firm exits/entries, departures  sive behavior causes welfare losses because of
from competitive pricing, interactions between  anti-competitive pricing but facilitates the
entry and pricing rules, and economies of scale.  exploitation of economies of scale.  The welfare
gains of moving to competitive pricing through
They performned  numerical simulations on a  the entry of new firms are mitigated because
representative three-sector semi-industrial  firms operate on a smaller than optimal scale.
economy (the sectors being agriculture, manufac-
turing, and services).  The simulations involved
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1.  Introduction
Quantitative  restrictions  (QRs)  are  the  most  common  form  of protection  in
many  developing  countries.  Often  this  type  of  protection  emerges  during  balance
of  payments  crises  but,  once  in  place,  is  not  removed. Students  of developing
countries'  foreign  exchange  regimes  have long  noted  that  QRs  have deleterious
effects  beyond  those  that  would  emerge  from  calculations  relying  strictly  on  the
'tariff  equivalent'  of quotas.  So far most analysis  has concentrated  on
quantifying  the cost of rent-seeking  activities  which allegedly  accompany
QRs.  1,  The  purpose  of this  paper  is  to extend  this  analysis  by parametrizing
two stylized  observations  that  have often  been noted about  the manufacturing
sector  of  QR-ridden  foreign  trade  regimes: (1)  unrealized  economies  of scale;
(2)  lack  of competition  among  domestic  firms. The  first  arises  because  of the
small  size  of the domestic  market;  the second  arises  because  of the  made-to-
measure protection  of QR trade regimes.  In sum, the paper builds  on the
stylized  observation  that  in  most  QR  regimes  too  many  firms  operate  at  too  small
a scale  and  often  make  above  normal  profits.
The interaction  between  trade  policies  and industrial  organization  has
received  theoretical  and  empirical  attention  in  industrial  organization  studies
of structure-conduct-performance  in  developed  countries  where  it  is  known  as  the
'import-discipline'  hypothesis:  the threat  of entry  by foreign  competitors
constrains  domestic  firms  to  adopt  entry-forestalling  prices  that  more _losely
approximate  competitive  prices. In addition  to receiving  empirical  support  in
cross-section  econometric  analyses  of structure-performance  relationships,  the
import-discipline  hypothesis has  also been recently included in general
equilibrium  calculations  of the  costs  of  protection  in  Canada  (Harris  1985,  Cox
and  Harris  1985).  2/ The  analysis  here  is  also  in  a  general  equilibrium  setting2
where  the  interactions  between  trade  policies  and  industrial  organization  issues
give rise to welfare costs not recognized  in the more traditional  applied
general  equilibrium  trade  models  where  constant  returns  to scale  prevail. The
mechanisms  incorporated  in  the  model  are  in  the  spirit  of  Harris,  though  because
of QRs, the  modelling  of trade  poltcies  and of the linkages  between  pricing
behavior  and  barriers  to entry  are  different.
The remainder  of the  paper is organized  as follows.  Section  2 reviews
evidence  on  linkages  between  firm  behavior,  firm  size  and  restrictiveness  of  the
trade  regime  in semi-industrial  developing  countries  that lend support  to our
stylized  modelling  strategy. Section  3 outlines  the  model.  Section  4 reports
on simulations  from a three sector  model that explores  the sensitivity  of
numerical  estimates  to  the  parameters  describing  foreign  trade  and  firm  behavior
under  increasing  returns  of scale.
2.  Profitability,  and Firm  Behavior  in  Manufacturing  Under  Different  Trade
Regimes: Evidence  and  Modelling  Issues
Evidence  about  the  extent  to which  restrictive  foreign  trade  regimes  in
developing  countries  give rise  to oligopolistic  behavior  and suboptimal  scale
is scant. This is so because  few  countries  have  drastically  liberalized  QRs.
One exception  is Chile  where  evidence  on firm  profitability  and  concentration
duting  a regime  ridden  by tariff  and  non-tariff  barriers  (1967)  can  be compared
with firm profitability  and concentration  during  a quasi-free-trade  regime
(1979).  Another  example  is  Korea  where  many  observers  agree  that  conglomerates
exercised  market  power  on domestic  sales  (see  World  Bank 1987).  The  evidence
from  the  manufacturing  sectors  in  these  two  countries  is  summarized  in  table  1.3
Table I
Profitability and  Exposure to Foreign Trade
(la)  Chilean Manufacturing
Mean  4-Firm  Import Share
Mean  Price-Cost  Concentration  Exports  in apparent
Year  Tariff  Margin  Ratio  Output  Consumption
1967  742  482  49.0  4.0?  20.0?
1979  iiZ  32Z  61.6  13.0X  29.02
(lb)  Korean Manufacturing
Per. rmance of Different  Market Structures
(Average  of 1978 and 1983)
High  Low
Monopoly/  More  Less  Export  Export
Mean  Oligopoly  Competitive  Protected  Protected  Share  Share
Price Cost
Margin  29Z  262  34%  242  252  29?
Sources:
(la)  de Melo and Urata (1986,  table 1).
(lb)  Lee, Urata, and Choi (1988,  tables 3 and 8).4
Table  la  compares  summary  statistics  from  the  Chilean  manufacturing
censuses  of 1967 and 1979.  The figures  indicate  that  during  tile  restrictive
quota-ridden  (QR)  trade  regime  of 1967,  price-cost  margins  were large  compared
with the  liberalized  trade  regime  of 1979. The  increase  in  concentration  (and
decline  in  the  number  of firms  not  shown  here)  between  the  two  census  years  is
dramatic  given  that the  manufacturing  sector  was of roughly  the same  size in
1967  and in 1979.  Full adjustment  to the  new trade  regime  was not complete,
however,  since  the uniform  tariff  structure  of 102  with no QRs had just been
achievad  in June 1979  when census  data  were gathered. It is noteworthy  that
increased  concentration  was accompanied  by lower  price cost margins (P1Ms),
which is consistent  with the removal  of protection  forcing  more competitive
pricing  because  firms  face  a  more  elastic  demLnd.
In  Korea,  the  legacy  of  Korea's  development  strategy  between  1973  and  1979
focussing  on heavy  and  chemical  industries  has been  an extremely  concentrated
industrial  structure  by international  standards.  For  example,  in  1982,  the  top
50  Korean  firms  accounted  for  37 percent  of total  sales  while in  Japan  the  top
100  rirms  accounted  for  27  percent  of  total  sales. The  figures  in  table  lb  show
higher  PCMs  in  the  more  concentrated  sectors.  Furthermore,  mean  PCMs  are  higher
in the  highly  protected  sectors. Also PCMs  are lower  for  sectors  with higher
export  shares. Both  results  suggest  that  sectors  that  compete  in international
markets  price  more competitively.
Further  evidence  taking  into  account  factors  other  than  protection  (e.g.
differences  in capital/labor  intensity  across  sectors)  support  the  conclusions
drawn  from  table  1.  For  Chile,  structural  change  tests  by de  Helo and  Urata,
(1986)  based  on a cross-sectoral  simultaneous  equations  model  of structure  and
performance  applied  to  the  two  census  years  for  41 industrial  sectors  confirmed5
these observations  and provided  further support for the import discipline
hypothesis  after controlling  for other factors.  Likewise,  in Korea, after
controlling  for other factors, results  from a cross-sectoral  simultaneous
equations  model of structure  and performance  (similar  to the one fitted  for
Chile)  indicated  lower  profitability  for  sectors  with  higher  import  penetration
shares. But  statistical  tests  revealed  no significant  structural  change  in  the
way the import  share  affected  profitability  in different  years,  a result  that
is not surprising  since  trade  liberalization  was much less in Korea than in
Chile.  3/
In sum, these comparisons  provide support for the import-discipline
hypothesis,  namely that protection,  by creating  barriers  to entry, allows
existing  firms  to collude  and earn above  normal  profits.  Unfortunately  the
evidence  does  not  provide  direct  support  for  Bhagwati's  (1965)  insight  that  QRs
create  more domestic  power  than  tariffs.  lowever,  the  Chilean  evidence  can  be
viewed  as  indirect  support  for  his  proposition  since  QRs  were  very  high in  1967
(See  Behrman  1976)  and  average  manufacturing-wide  profitability  was almost  50
percent  higher  than  in 1979.
The  Chilean  trade  liberalization  was also  accompanied  by an increase  in
intra-industry  trade  and  a reduction  in the  number  nf firms  (see  de Melo and
Urata 1986, table 1).  This outcome is consistent  with recent  models of
international  trade  featuring economies of  scale with  free-entry  and  a
noncooperative equilibrium among  firms  in  Chamberlinian monopolistic
competition. A prediction  of these  models  is that a reduction  in protection
leads  to intra-industry  specialization  and  more intra-industry  trade.  4/  And
the  exit  of firms  in  response  to  a  major  trade  liberalization  is  consistent  with
the proposition  that protection  creates  excessive  entry.  This observation,
known as the inefficient  entry problem, implies  that the number of firms6
permitted  by economies  of scale  is small  enongn  to allow  effective  collusivv.
behavior  that  raises  profits  which  in  turn  attracts  new  firms  into  the  industry
until sufficient  entry eliminates  profits  by driving  scale  down and average
costs  up. 5/
In the absence  of information  about  foreign  firm  behavior  during  trade
liberalization,  in  the  simulations  reported below, we  assume ptfectly
competitive  behavior  on the  part  of foreign  suppliers.  6/ Then  the  question  is
whether  protection,  which  raises  profitability  even  in  the  absence  of  collu-;ion,
will not reduce  the penalty for cheating  on a collusive  agreement  This
suggests  that  a  variable  price-fixing  agreement  should  set  prices  low  enough  to
make cheating  unappeeling (see Rotemberg and Saloner (1988)).  Below we
recognize  this  possibility  by allowing  for  collusive  behavior  to diminish  via
entry.
A final  issue  not recognized  in the trade and industrial  organization
literature  but  common  to  many foreign  trade  regimes  in  developing  countries  is
that,  in foreign-exchange-scarce  economies,  nearly  all imports  are  essential,
that  is  they  are  intermediates  not  produced  domestically.  One  would  then  expect
that the  proliferation  of inefficient  firms  engendered  by the  QR regime  would
eventually  cease  when  quotas  become  very  binding. In  our  modeling,  we explore
this  possibility  by analyzing  a  case  where  firm  entry  depends  negatively  on  how
binding  QRs  are.
We approach the modelling of the welfare costs of QR regimes in a
sequential  manner to isolate the effects of changes in scale efficiency,
entry/exit  and  departure  from  average  cost  pricing. The  pricing  rules  for  the
most part are ad-hoc,  since  they are intended  to represent  situations  where
firms  can  coexist  while  earning  above  normal  profits. The  next  section  presents
the different  variants of a model which includes  economies  of schle with7
variable  collusive  behavior,  and  firm  entry/exit  in  response  to changes  in  the
degree  of restrictiveness  of QRs.
3.  A Stylized  CGE  Model  with  QR and  Industrial  Organization  Focus
The model developed  here is a static  one-period  CGE model.  (For  the
illustrative  welfare  calculation  reported  in  section  4,  the  representative  semi-
industrial economy  is  aggregated  into  three  sectors:  agriculture,
manufacturing,  and  services.)  In  addition to  its  focus on  industrial
organizdtion  issues, the model differs from companion formulations  (e.g.
Devarajan  and  Rodrik  (1989)  and  de  Melo  and  Roland-Holst  (forthcoming))  because
of its treatment  of oligopolistic  behavior. Here  we focus  on exploring  the
effect  of alternative  oligopolistic  pricing  rules.  The model has a simple
structure. There  is no government  sector  and  one single  consumer  to simplify
the  disposition  of rents  under  binding  QRs.  Final  demand  excludes  investment
demand, and thus consists  of intermediate  demand,  consumption  demand, and
imports  and  exports.
The specification  ;c foreign  trade  combines  the  small  country  assumption
with  symmetric  national  product  differentiation  for  imports  and  exports.  7/ For
private  consumption,  we specify  an  LES  demand  system. For  intermediate  demand,
domebtic  and imported  intermediate  imports  of a same category  are imperfect
substitutes  in use.  For example,  technology  does  not allow  for substitution
between steel and chemicals  as inputs,  but substitution  is allowed  between
domestic  and imported  steel,  and  domestic  and  imported  steel  need not combine
in use in the same  proportions  across  users.  8/  Two  primary  factors,  capital
and  labor,  mobile  across  sectors,  combine  to  produce  value-added.
Our treatment  of firm pricing  behavior  relies  on the observation  that
domestic  industrial  policy  coupled  with import  rationing  usually  provides  an8
environment  in  which  there  are  barriers  to  entry. This  allows  firms  to depart
from average  cost pricing  and to ma'ntain  above  normal  profits in long-run
equilibrium  under  QRs.  Barriers  to entry  come from the  presence  of QRs, and
domestic  barriers  to entry  come from  various  incentive!  (investment,  credit,
etc.),  which  are  appropriated  by incumbent  firms  (for  evidence  see  Frischtak  et
al.  1989).
Since  the  model  only includes  barriers  to entry  from imports,  we start
with our  modelling  assumptions  about  QRs. We model  QR-ridden  trade  regimes  by
rationing  (separately  or  jointly)  intermediates  and  consumer  goods. Since  there
is only  one representative  consumer,  rents  from consumption  anid  intermediate
demand  rationing  are  returned  in lump-sum  to the  representative  consumer. For
future  reference  denote  by RCi  and  RVj  the  rents  arising  from  rationing  import
consum;)tion  and intermediate  goods.  Our proxy  for the  extent  of barriers  to
entry  in sector  i  will be Bi - (RCi+RVi)/Xi,  i.e.  the  value  of rents  per  unit
of domestic  output. The  proxy  is  coarse,  but  it  is  the  most  natural  one  in  this
kind of model, and it captures  the idea that barriers  to entry  increase  as
quotas  become  more binding.
So  far  we have  said  nothing  about  firm  entry-exit,  and  firm  behavior. We
will  consider  five  model  variants,  ranging  from  constant  returns  to scale  (CRTS)
to increasing  returns  to scale  :LATS)  with  collusive  behavior.
Start  with the traditional  case where all firms have CRTS production
functions  (i.e.  no fixed  costs).  This is the base case (variant  1) and the
typical  firm  pricing  rule  is:
(1)  PXi  - TCi/Xi9
In  equation  (1),  PXi  is  unit  price  (a  weighted  some  of export  sale  price
and  domestic  sale  price);  TCi  is  total  costs;  VCi  is  variable  costs;  and;  Xi is
firm output.  Under CRTS,  TCi - VCi so that firms  price  at marginal  costs.
Therefore,  in variant  1, the  welfare  costs  of rationing  are the traditional
production  and  consumption  costs  emphasized  in the  literature  on the costs  of
protection.
Next  consider  the  introduction  of  fixed  costs. Denote  the  number  of firms
in  the  industry  by Ni  where  a  bar  denotes  that  the  number  of firms  is  fixed  for
now. As in  Harris  (1985)  we have:
(2)  TCi =  VCi +  FCi
where  FCi  is fixed  costs  defined  by:
(3)  FCi  = (W  FLi +  R  FKi) Ni
and FL,  and PK, are  the labor  and  machines  necessary  to keep the  plant  open.
Throughout,  we  maintain  the  assumption  that  variable  costs,  VCi,  are  independent
of scale. However,  variable  costs  will shift  up  with a QR because  firms  have
to pay the  premium-inclusive  price  for  imported  intermediates.  The  parameter
we use to calibrate  economies  of scale  is the cost-disadvantage-ratio  (CDR),
defined  as CDRi  E FCi/TCi. This is  variant  2.  In this  variant,  firms  use  the
pricing  rule  described  in equation  (1)  so that there  are zero  profits. With
this  variant,  we assess  the  impact  of  IRTS  on  scale  efficiency.  The  calibration
of the  model  to the  representative  data  set  assumes  that  economies  of scale  are
only  operative  when  QRs  are  binding.10
Next come  several  variants  which  we discuss  together  since  they  involve
the  treatment  of entry  and  pricing  and  the  interaction  between  the  two.  From
Section  2,  we assume  that  firm  entry  is  an increasing  function  of profits,  ri,
that  result  from  collusive  behavior. By  choice  of  units,  assume  one  firm  prior
to rationing. Then  firm  entry  is g_ven  by:
(4)  Ni  = 1  + Si (ri) 7i  Si  =  1 if  FCi>O
=  0  otherwise
where  7i >  0 is  a parameter.
To examine tie  problem  of inefficient  entry separately from  collusive
pricing,  we combine  the  average  cost  pricing  rule  of  equation  (1)  with  equation
(3)  in which ri is replaced  by Bi, the rents  accruing  from QRs in sector  i.
This  is  variant  3 (inefficient  entry,  no collusive  pricing). Because  there  is
only  one  representative  consamer,  and  no  government  behavior,  rents  are  returned
to the  consumer  in  a lump-sum  manner.
Now consider  collusive  behavior.  For firm pricing,  we assume that
departure  from  competitive  pricing  is greater  the  more quotas  are  binding  but
that  firm  entry  may  dampen  collusive  behavior. Firm  pricing  is given  by:
(5)  PXi =  TCi/Xi + ai Bai/Nqi
where  ai,  ai Pi > 0 are  again  parameters.
As mentioned  earlier,  this representation  of pricing  behavior  has no
specific  theoretical  foundation  and  is  essentially  ad-hoc,  but  it  is  convenient
to  explore  parametrically  a  wide range  of interactions.  In the  experiments  of
Section  4 we report  two combinations. In variant  4, we consider  collusive
pricing  but  no entry  (ai>O,  Pj=yi=0).  This  is  the  polar  case  to  Cox  and  Harris11
and de  Melo and  Roland-Holst  where collusive pricing is  the cause of entry  which
continues until  Xi  =  0  in the new  long-run equilibrium.  In variant  5  we
introduce  simultaneously entry  and  the negative  effect  that  entry  has  on
collusive  behavior (ai.Pi,7i  > 0)-  Other  variants are possible, including the
case in  which entry leads again to zero long-run profits, but we do not report
experiments with these variants here since evidence seems to suggest that QR
trade regimes are accompanied  by higher long-run  equilibrium profits than other
foreign trade regimes.
Even though the options included  here allow us to consider a fairly broad
set  of interactions  between trade policy and industrial  organization, the range
is still limited.  For example, it is quite possible that the excessive entry
problem that appears to characterize QR trade regimes in developing countries
would be better modelled by having two groups of firms:  large and small with
a  leader-follower  model where entry would be restricted to small (and perhaps
less efficient) firms.
4.  Illustrative Simulations of the  Welfare Costs of Protection
under QR Trade Regimes
We now report  results  from simulations  with a three-sector  representative
model of a semi-industrial  economy.  The sectors are agriculture,  manufacturing
and  services.  Economies  of  scale,  when  operative,  are  restricted  to
manufacturing.  Services  are  nontradable.  The  equilibrium  values resulting  from
calibrating the model  are  given in the Appendix.  Initial national  incomie
(against which welfare losses are measured) is 594 and, by choice of units:
Exports  =  imports =  250  (in domestic  curre:icy  units)  with  the  followying
breakdoxn for  imports:  intermediates (177) and consumer goods  (73).  This
initial situation thus depicts an open semi-industrialized economy like Korea12
in the  middle  seventies  (see  Kubo, et. al. 1986).  Consequently  the  welfare
costs  reported  below  may  be viewed  as an upper  bound,  and one  may accordingly
wish tc  scale  down  the  estimates  to  have  a  more representative  initial  starting
poir.t.  However,  we  would  argue  that  the  alternative  to  which  a  QR-ridden  trade
regime  should  be evaluated  is  precisely  a relatively  undistorted  economy,  i.e.,
the  case  chosen  here.
We start  by reporting  results  of sensitivity  analysis. In table  2, we
vary  the  price  elasticities  of import  demand  and  export  supply  in  a  CRTS  model.
We show that the welfare costs of imposing  QRs are higher, the less price
responsive  are import  demands  and export  supplies. In table  3, we vary the
extent  of  economies  of scale  in  the  version  of  the  model  with zero  profits. We
show  that  across-the-board  rationing  of imports  results  in a  welfare  loss  and
that  the  welfare  loss is  greater,  the  mort there  are  unexploited  economies  of
scale.
Table  2 measures  the  costs (expressed  as percentage  of national  Income)
of increasingly  binding  quotas.  All welfare results  are obtained  from the
equivalent  variation  measure  applied  to  the  indirect  utility  function  associated
with the  Cobb-Douglas  utility  function  describing  consumer  choice.  Column  2
shows  that  restricting  consumer  goods  imports  alone  has  a  relatively  small  cost,
reaching  only 2.7  percent  of base  national  income  when they  are  restricted  to
50 percent  of their  initial  level. This is so both  because  of the  calibrated
price elasticities  of final  demand (unitary  price elasticities)  and because
consumer goods are typically a  small fraction  of  total imports.  When
intermediates  are  included,  welfare  costs  reach  13  percent. Usually,  rationing
of imported  intermediates  will  not  exceed  20  percent  in  restrictive  QR regimes.
If consumer  rationing  comes first  and is carried  out to 50 percent,  welfare
costs  could  still  be in the  range  of 7 to  13 percent,  depending  on the  extent13
Table  2
Welfare  Costs  of  Rationing  (Variant  1)
Rationing  Consumer  Consumer  and  Intermediate  Imports
Rate  a/  Imports  High  Trade  b/  Low  Trade  b/
Elasticities  Elasticities
(1.5)  (0.5)
Column  1  2  3
.9  0.0  0.4  1.0
.8  0.4  1.7  4.9
.7  0.8  4.1  11.9
.6  1.6  7.7  NS
.5  2.7  13.0  NS
Notes:  Variant  1  assumes  CRTS  across  all  sectors. Welfare  costs  measured  by
the  equivalent  variation  expressed  as a  percentage  of pre-rationing
national  income  (e.g.  1.0  is  one  percent  of  national  income).
NS:  No solution  (the  algorithm  failed  to  converge).
a/  Expresses  constrained  imports  as  proportion  of unrationed  import  levels.
b/  High (low)  trade  elasticities  assume  across-the-board  price  elasticities
of import  demand  and  export  supply  of 1.5  (0.5).14
c el-isLicity  )ptimism.  From  now  on,  we consider  only  high  trade  elasticities,
whicli  way be  mcre  representative  of  a semi-industrial  economy  where  substitution
possibilities are greater than in a less industrialized economy.
lable 3 introduces  economies of scale (variant  2).  Results from Table 3
should  be compared  with the results  in  Table 2, Column 2.  Calibration for scale
ecorJ)njes  i-n  manufacturing  was done  to take into  account that, even in a  medium-
size  developing  country,  only  a  fraction  of  manufacturing sectors  have economies
of  scale.  Somewhat  arbitrarily, the cost disadvantage  ratio (CDR)  parameter is
set  i  value  that  produces a scale  elasticity and about  one-half the average  used
by Cox and Harris for  Canada (CDR=0.07).  If anything,  we would argue that this
esiiinate  of unexploited  economies  of scale  is on the  low  side  because  we have
not  included  the costs  of idle capacity  that is said to be prevalent  among
manofacturing  firms  in  highly  restricted  QR trade  regimes.
When  compared  with  the  results  in  table  2,  the  welfare  costs  of rationing
are higher  under IRTS than under CRTS.  This is so, even though  increasing
rationing  (where  lower imports  are accompanied  by lower  exports  through  the
balance  of trade  constraint)  leads  to a slight  increase  in scale  efficiency
refiec'Led  in  higher values  of  the  scale elasticity as  the  rationing  rate
inic)cases.  The reason is similar to the results in table 2.  With fixed costs,
tEhe  econciroy  is  less able to adjust to rationing. Therefore  the  flexibility  to
adbi.st  is  lower,  the higher is the share of fixed  costs  in total  costs.  The
results in table 3 suggest that this latter  effect dominates the scale effect.
CuLtting  in  half  the value of CDR only has an impact  on the computed  value of the
local economlOics  of  scale  when rationing  is small. When  rationing is  severe,  the
upoaq)d  t1hi'-t  in variable costs dominates, and the computed welfare costs are
'Ju:  '  . Iser  - ve to variations in CDR.  From now on, we set  CDR  =  0.07.15
Table 3
Welfare Costs of Rationing (Variant  2)
to Scale in Manufacturing a/
Rationing Rate a/  .9  .8  .7  .6  .5
CDR =  0.07  5.3  6.1  8.1  11.2  16.0
Scale elasticity b/  (.925)  (.956)
CDR =  0.035  2.7  3.8  5.9  9.4  14.4
Scale elasticity b/  (.965)  (.979)
a/  See  table  2  for  definition.  Rationine  is  for  both  consumer  and
intermediate goods.
b/  The scale elasticity  for solutions with  rationing rates of  .9 and  .5
respectively  are reported  in parentheses. Scale  elasticities  are  computed
as the ratiu of marginal to average costs at the solution values.
Notes:  CDR, the cost  disadvantage ratio, is  defined  s  the ratio  of fixed  costs
to total costs.16
We now come to the  more controversial  aspects  of the  links  between  QR
regimes  and industrial  organization  as we introduce  excessive  entry (variant
3),  collusive  behavior  ;.ariant  4),  and  excessive  entry  cum  collusive  behpvior
variant  5). The  results  of  these  alternative  formulations  are  reported  in  Table
4 for  across-the-board  rationing  rates  of 20  percent  and  50 percent. Because
parametrizing  is  even  more  difficult  in  these  cases,  we opted  to  approximate  the
Chilean  firm exit rate  when we introduce  excessive  entry (variant  3) and the
rationing  rate  is  50 percent.  The  same  procedure  is  adopted  when  we parametrize
collusive  behavior  (variant  4): we approximate  the  decline  in PCM  observed  in
Chile between 1967 and 1979.  The parameters  for variants  3 and 4 remain
unchanged  in  variant  5.
Under  this  parametrization,  the  welfare  costs  of  a  50  percent  rationing
rate  continue  to be dominated  by the  upward  shift  in  variable  costs  caused  by
the  higher  costs  of imported  intermediate  inputs. Therefore,  we concentrate  on
the results for a 20 percent rationing  rate of consumer  and intermediate
imports.  The  major  difference  in  estimates  is  accounted  for  by  the  introduction
of scale  economies.  Across-the-board  rationing  has  a  welfare  cost  that  is  three
times  higher  under  IRTS than  under  CRTS.  Clearly,  a less  costly  alternative
would  be to  constrain  rationing  to  sectors  with IRTS  so  that  resources  would  be
drawn  into  these  sectors  and  scale  efficiency  would  be raised.
Contrasting  the welfare costs of collusive  behavior  with no entry
(variant  4) with excessive  entry  and no collusive  behavior  (variant  3), one
finds  that  welfare  costs  are  the  same  for  this  parametrization.  When the  two
variants  interact  (variant  5),  we.Lfare  costs  of  rationing  are  marginally  higher.
The results  from  these  simulations  suggest  that  there  is  a trade-off  between
excessive  entry  and  collusive  behavior. Collusive  behavior  facilitates  theTable 4
A Comparison of the Welfare Costs of Rationing
Alternative  Market Structures
Rationing  Variant 1  Variant 2  Variant 3  Variant 4  Variant 5
Rate a/  CRTS  IRTS;  no  IRTS  IRTS;  IRTS;
entry,  no  entry, no  no entry,  entry,
collusive  collusive  collusive  collusive
behavior  behavior  behavior  behavior
Weliare Costs:
(Z  of base  .8  1.7  6.1  6.5  6.5  6.7
national income)  .5  13.0  16.0  16.7  17.1  17.3
Price Cost Margin  .8  0  0  0  6.0  6.3
(Ci)
.5  0  0  0  25.7  21.3
-a
Number of firms  .8  1  1  1.07  1  1.06
(Ratio  to  base)  .5  1  1  1.24  1  1.18
Notes:  Model  variants refer to  variants  described  in Section  3.  Parameter  values for  all results are:  High
trade elasticities (1.5),  and CDR =  0.07.
a/  See  table 2 for definition.  Rationing is for both intermediates  and consumption goods.
b/  The price cost  margin is measured by the profit rate.18
exploitation  of scale  econcomies  but  adds  a  welfare  cost  because  pricing  exceeds
average costs.  Entry to eliminate above normal profits leads to scale
inefficiency.
5.  Conclusions
The  empirical  evidence  reviewed  in this  paper  suggests  that  QR trade
regimes  in developing  countries  are  characterized  by above  normal  profits  and
excessive  entry  (in  the  sense  of too  many firms  operating  at suboptimal  scale)
in manufacturing.  Cross-sectional  econometric  evidence, in which factors
contributing  to differences  in profitability  across sectors  are taken into
account,  further support  the view that imports  create  a discipline  on the
behavior  of domestic  firms  in  the  sense  that  firms  in sectors  with  high import
shares  adopt  pricing  rules  that  more  closely  approximate  competitive  behavior.
This  evidence  serves  as a  basis  for  building  a three  sector  calibrated
simulation  model  to  examine  the  welfare  effects  of  an  increase  in  QRs  where  some
sectors  have  increasing  returns  to  scale. Several  model  variants  are  introduced
separately  to ascertain  the effects  of introducing  economies  of scale,  firm
entry/exit,  departure  from  competitive  pricing,  and  interactions  between  entry
and  pricing  rules.
Numerical  simulations  are then performed  on a representative  three-
sector  semi-industrial  economy  with  the  simulations  consisting  of  progressively
tightening  QRs  starting  from  a  regime  with  no  QRs. Numerical  simulations  suggest
as a  rough  order  of  magnitude  that  the  traditional  welfare  cost  calculations  for
moderate  rationing  could  be tripled  if the  manufacturing  sector  has increasing
returns to  scale.  Further experimentation  with alternative  formulations
including  entry  until  profits  are  eliminated  and  oligopolistic  pricing  with no
entry  indicate  a trade-off  between  scale  efficiency  loss  caused  by firm  entry19
to eliminate  profits,  and  departures  from  average  cost  pricing  under  collusive
arrangements.20
Notes
1/  Krueger  (1974)  first  drew attention  to the  potential  costs  of rent-
seeking  activities  in restrictive  trade regimes.  For illustrative
quantitative  estimates  of the  costs  of rent-seeking  see  Mohammad  and
Whalley  (1984),  and  Grais,  de  Melo  and  Urata (1986).
2/  Theoretical  and  empirical  studies  of the  import  discipline  hypothesis
for  develop  countries  are  covered  in  two  symposia  edited  Caves  (1980)
and  Geroski  and  Jacquemin  (1981).  For  developing  countries  see  de  Melo
and  Urata  (1986),  Rodrik  (1988),  Frischtak  et al. (1989),  Roberts  and
Tybout  (forthcoming),  and  citations  therein.
3/  See  Lee,  Urata  and  Choi  (1986).  Further  tests  for  Korea  provide  support
for the  'structuralist  view" (rather  than the  "efficiency  view")
interpretation  of a positive  correlation  between concentration  and
profitability. The two views are contrasted  in Clarke,  Davies  and
Waterson  (1984).
4/  Increased  intra-industry  specialization  was also accomplished  by a
reduction  in  the  number  of  products  at  the  plant  level. See  Corbo  and
de Melo (1985,  chp. 1) for  a summary  of firm-level  interviews  that
indicate  product  rationalization,  and  Harris  (1985)  for  modelling  of
this  effect  in  the  Canadian  context.
5/  Note  however  that  inefficient  entry  may  also  occur  in  the  Cournot  model
with free  entry. See  Eastman  and  Stykolt  (1960)  and  Dixit  and  Norman
(1980).
6/  Corti  and de  Melo (1985)  note the  effect  of barriers  to entry  in the
commerce  sector  during  the  trade  liberalizations  in  the  Southern  Cone.
Several  cases  of "indirect"  cooperation  between  domestic  producers  and
foreign  firms  were  revealed  by  interviews:  producers  turned  themselves
into  importers  and  entered  a  profit  sharing  agreement  with  foreign  firms
and  maintained  high  retail  prices. This  suggests  that  the  assumption
of  perfectly  competitive  behavior  on  the  part  of foreign  suppliers  may
not  be appropriate.
7/  This treatment  differs from Harris (1985)  and is viewed as more
appropriate  since  it  controls  for  trade-reform-induced  terms-of-trade
effects  which  may influence  heavily  welfare  calculations. The offer
curve  implications  of  this  formulation  are  treated  qualitatively  in  de
Melo and  Robinson  (1989).21
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Appendlx
The  simulations  reported in  the  text are  derived from a  three  sector
representative  semi-industrial  economy. The  initial  solution  was  calibrated  to
reproduce  the following  initial  equilibrium  values  (with  all  prices  set  equal
to one  by choice  of  units):
Agriculture  Manufacturing  Services
Gross  output
(XO)  300  400  500
Exports  100  150
Domestic  Consumption  65  111  345
Imported  Consumption  28  45
Imported  Intermediates  46  115  16
Domestic  Intermediates  135  139  155
National  income  594
The  model  also  includes  tariffs  and  subsidies  which  are  not  altered. Production
functions  are  Cobb-Douglas  and the  parameters  of the  LES system  are such  that
all subsistence  minima  are  set  to zero.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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